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Abstract
Given the increasing diversity of religious beliefs and outlooks in the United States, John
Dewey’s proposals regarding “a common faith” can help educators provide the tools for
their students to think critically about these and other issues related to the changing
religious landscape. Particular attention is given to three groups of students: those who
are adherents of dogmatic or exclusivist religious communities; those who share the
belief that no legitimate value judgments about religious faith are possible; and those
religiously unaffiliated students who feel excluded from the possibility of religious faith.
Let me begin by thanking the society’s officers: President Kathleen KnightAbowitz, President-Elect Len Waks, immediate past President Deron Boyles, Secretary-Treasurer Kyle Greenwalt, membership and development officer Mark Kissling,
and of course student liaison Matt Ryg and webmaster Zane Wubbena. I know
that their many efforts on behalf of this society are much appreciated by all of us.
In 1955, when Will Herberg published his influential book, Protestant–
Catholic–Jew, it could be said with some confidence that an essay in American
religious sociology could claim exhaustive coverage by restricting its analysis to
those three faiths. Scarcely a decade later, however, that formula would be obsolescent. The 1960s saw the rise of what José Casanova, glossing Thomas Luckmann,
termed religions “of self expression and self-realization along with the triumph of
the therapeutic.”1 Thirty years further on, the 1990s gave us “pastoral care of the
soul as big business” and the rejection of organized religion in favor of ecumenical
spirituality. Americans were offered a new category, “spiritual but not religious.”2
Since that time, the religious profile of America, never simple, has become even
more complex. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life reports that “more than
one quarter (28%) of American adults have left the faith in which they were raised in
favor of another religion—or no religion at all. If change in affiliation from one type
of Protestantism to another is included, roughly 44% of adults have either switched
religious affiliation, moved from being unaffiliated with any religion to being affiliated with a particular faith, or dropped any connection to a specific religious tradition
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altogether.”3 In its 2012 survey, Pew reports that some 19% of Americans claimed no religious affiliation. Among those who describe themselves as politically liberal, that figure
is in the neighborhood of 40% and trending upward. Further, “among Americans ages
18–29, one in three say they are not currently affiliated with any particular religion.”4
This complex picture, coupled with the fact that our students may also bring
their religious backgrounds as Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, or Wiccans to our
classrooms, provokes a consideration of my topic: What we can teach when we
teach (about) religion.
Given the dogmatism and exclusivity of some contemporary forms of religious
belief, for example, how can the religious experiences of our students be liberated so
that they can travel along broader avenues? Given the fact that we are now living in
what is increasingly becoming a culturally rich and highly pluralistic society, how can
we help our students assess whether some forms of religious belief are better adapted
than others to these new circumstances? Is it possible for us and our fellow Americans, despite our many individual and cultural differences, to share a common faith?
If so, what form would that type of faith take? And how can we help our students
develop the tools they will need to think critically about these questions, which are
all the more difficult because they are both intensely personal and profoundly public?
More specifically, I want to focus on these questions with three very different groups of students in mind. Although these groups are not exhaustive, they
do tend to cut across the religious (and nonreligious) affiliations that are reflected
in the Pew studies.
The first group includes those who share the beliefs of dogmatic and exclusivist
religious communities. The second group includes those who share the belief that now
there is only deferral and difference—that commonality among humans is ephemeral
and that legitimate value judgments about religious faith and practice are elusive. The
third group includes those who feel that because they are not affiliated with any religious community, they are therefore excluded from the possibility of religious faith.
It is important to note that the issue I am addressing is closely related to, but
significantly distinct from, controversies regarding how the Bible can be taught in
public schools. Nevertheless, in their excellent empirical study of that issue, For
the Civic Good: The Liberal Case for Teaching Religion in the Public Schools, Walter
Feinberg and Richard A. Layton have provided a set of tools that can be useful for
our present purposes. First, they are careful to distinguish constitutional legitimacy
from educational legitimacy. As to the former, constitutional legitimacy, they cite
the influential Supreme Court decision in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)
regarding the constitutionality of government legislation in the sphere of religion.
Chief Justice Warren Burger delineated the following three-part test: “First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster ‘excessive entanglement with religion.’”5
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If constitutional legitimacy tends to be restrictive with respect to government, then educational legitimacy can be understood as expansive with respect
to the teacher. Feinberg and Layton offer three criteria of educational legitimacy:
first, there should be respect based on the obligation of teachers to students; second,
there should be inclusiveness based on the obligation of teachers to a democratic
public; and third, there should be academic integrity based on the obligation of
teachers to their subject matter. These are important considerations that provide a
background for thinking about what we can teach when we teach (about) religion.
More specific to my topic, however, I believe that one of the ways we can begin
to address the needs of students of the three types I have mentioned is by helping
them to understand that evolution, including the evolution of religious beliefs and
institutions, is a reality that they do well to take into account if they are to understand their milieu historically, culturally, and socially.
Of course, I need not remind this audience that the question of how (or indeed
whether) evolution is to be taught in public schools, colleges, and universities is itself
often a subject of contention. In a recent interview, for example, the Governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, appeared to be confused about that very issue.6 But since that
matter is outside the scope of what I want to discuss today, I hope you will simply allow
me to stipulate that as teachers we have an obligation to educate our students about
evolution as both fact and theory whenever the topic is appropriate to our subject matter. In their outstanding essay “Addressing Controversies in Science and Education: A
Pragmatic Approach to Evolution Education,” David Hildebrand, Kimberly Bilica, and
John Capps provide an excellent discussion of this issue that is rich in themes that will
be familiar to members of this society, so I am pleased to recommend their study to you.
So as we think about what we can teach when we teach (about) religion, it is
important that we emphasize the fact that evolution itself evolves, that is, that what
we understand by the evolution of beliefs and practices itself undergoes continual
change. Education about religion means that we must encourage our students to
reject absolutist facades that deny progress through time, to reject the urge to take
refuge in vague varieties of relativism, and also to reject the possibility that religious
experience is something that is no longer possible for educated men and women.
Honesty demands that we not blink at the fact that if our students are to
understand their place in our rapidly changing world, then it is inevitable that
some systems of religious belief be understood as more evolved than others. By
this I mean that some are better adapted than others to the demands of life in our
rapidly changing environment.
There are many productive ways to address this issue. One way is to start from historical accounts and taxonomies. Robert Bellah, for example, has proposed that we think
historically; he offers five stages: (1) the primitive-aboriginal stage, (2) the archaic stage
of ancient Greece, (3) the historical stage of Roman Catholicism, (4) the early modern
stage of Protestantism, and (5) the modern stage of meditative and integrative religions.7
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Even given its apparent Eurocentric bias, this schema can serve as a tool for
opening up fruitful classroom discussions, since it opens the door in stage five
for consideration of non-Western religions such as Buddhism. Other taxonomies
track progress from less to more evolved forms in terms of ontological commitments, organizational structures, commitment to ecumenical values, and so on.
The use of these historical accounts and taxonomies in no way commits us either
to rigid hierarchies or to a lazy ecumenism that attempts to prop itself up on an
everything-is-of-equal-value reading of important studies in comparative religion.
Properly employed, these taxonomies can stimulate rich, productive discussions
about the relative value of various forms of religious expression within the context
of the problems and prospects that our students face.
It is also important to remind our students that just as is often the case with
biological evolution, newer forms of religious expression and institutions are not by
that very fact more evolved. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, God: A Biography,
for example, Jack Miles suggests that the idea we find in the Hebrew Bible—especially
in the books of Genesis and Job—that one can argue with God (and in the case of
Job, that one can even take the moral high ground) is much more richly evolved than
some of the aspects of the via negativa of medieval Latin Christianity.8 In terms of my
wider point, the via negativa constituted a move in theology from process to stasis,
whereas we know that evolutionary thinking has generally moved in the opposite
direction, from the stasis of fixed species to models that take process into account.
It would, however, be a mistake to take this point as praise for Judaism over
Christianity in general. That would not be possible in any event, given the fact that
the terms Judaism and Christianity designate a wide range of beliefs within their
respective communities. The point instead would be to initiate a discussion of the
relative role of human agency and competing concepts of the self within the various strands of the two religious traditions.
Good pedagogy dictates that we assess the ways that religious institutions
accommodate themselves to existing environments, as well as the ways that they seek
to alter those environments. To claim that we cannot follow these changes through
time, to claim that we cannot assess their value with respect to certain universalizable values such as tolerance, charity, the promotion of emotional well-being, and
the growth of individuals and communities, to name a few, would not just be to
block the way to inquiry: it would strike at the heart of the educational process itself.
A corollary of this point is that not all existing contexts of religious beliefs and
practices are created equal. It is undeniable, for example, that we are now experiencing the strong pull of globalizing tendencies. During the coming decades we will
be living ever more intimately with peoples and institutions that are quite different
from us and our own. It behooves us and our students to find successful ways of
doing so. Measured against this larger, global, cultural context, then, it makes no
sense at all to say that the local cultural context of the caste system that supports

Volume 32 (2) 2016

8

L. A. Hickman

the strand of Hinduism that defends abuse of the Dalits (or “untouchables”) is as
evolved as the democratic cultural context that supports those strands of valuecreating Buddhism that promote equality across lines of class, relative affluence,
gender, and sexual orientation.
About such matters we must be clear for all of our students, regardless of
whether they attempt to retreat behind exclusivist religious dogma, or assert with
the confidence of privilege that no particular vantage point is privileged over any
other, or think that the possibility of religious faith is closed to them because of
their lack of institutional affiliation.
In short, it is essential that we prepare the ground for teaching our students
that some religious expressions are more evolved than others, and by that I mean
that they are better adapted to the needs of human growth and the opportunities
of our changing global circumstances.
Now, there will inevitably be members of exclusivist religious groups who
will object that any educator who follows the path that I have just described,
who practices what we might call a pragmatist pedagogy, will be guilty of his or her
own form of proselytizing on behalf of the religion of “secular humanism.” I have
experienced this argument in my own classrooms. This is how it runs: first premise:
the critical, pragmatist pedagogy of religion of the type I am describing is a form of
secular humanism; second premise: secular humanism is religion by another name;
conclusion: it must therefore follow that to advance a critical pragmatist pedagogy of
religion is to proselytize for one particular religion at the expense of others. Q. E. D.
There are several ways to respond to this type of argument. First, there is the
law. As Feinberg and Layton have pointed out, “the courts have . . . affirmed that
exposure of students to ideas and values that may be at odds with their own firmly
held religious beliefs does not constitute disapproval of religion or establishment
of an alleged religious perspective, such as ‘secular humanism.’”9
Second, it is easy enough to draw a bright line of sharp distinction between
proselytizing, on one side, and free and open inquiry, on the other. Generally
speaking, proselytizing tends to occur in contexts or settings that many regard as
inappropriate; it tends to be insensitive to cultural and individual backgrounds,
it begins and ends with positions that are intransigent and dogmatic, and it often
involves behavior that is aggressive.
The pragmatist pedagogy I am describing takes pains to develop appropriate contexts for discussion. It insists that all parties be sensitive to the cultural and
individual backgrounds of all discussants. It ensures that discussions remain nondogmatic and open to new ideas. It avoids aggressive behavior by carefully managing discussions in ways that maximize respect.
Whether we call this type of pedagogy pragmatist or not is of little importance. It can have various names. It draws on the discourse ethics advanced by
Juergen Habermas as a basis for democratic life. It resonates with what Richard
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Bernstein has termed a democratic ethos: in which an engaged pluralism is at once
agonistic and discursive; in which consensus is neither a presupposition nor a
goal; in which the most diverse perspectives are welcomed; and in which there is
a genuine willingness to listen, “to really listen and to hear what the other is saying, to use one’s imagination to understand what may initially strike one as alien
and even repugnant.”10
We may wish to call this type of education critical, or humanist, or liberal,
or democratic, or something similar. I have chosen to call it pragmatist because of
its intimate connection to the work of John Dewey. But I believe that each of these
names is appropriate to an educational practice that sets out the terms and conditions for unhindered discussions that include respect, tolerance, civility, open
minds, generosity of spirit, and fair treatment across lines of gender, class, race, and
sexual orientation. I submit that attacks on educational practice of this type are not
simply attacks on democratic processes; they are also attacks on the experimental
methods of the physical and social sciences.
It is important to be clear on this matter: pragmatist educational practice
advances arm-in-arm with the methods of the sciences. Once we begin to assess
religious beliefs and practices in terms of their functional roles within their cultural
contexts, the implications tend to penetrate deeply into economic issues such as the
feminization of poverty; public health issues, and issues that involve environmental
sustainability. These are areas in which there are reliable, experimentally obtained
data—data that allow us to transcend dogma and that provide the basis for intelligent, informed classroom discussions of religious belief and practice.
It is also important to remind ourselves that just as is the case with biological
evolution, older and newer institutional forms often exist side by side, even within
religious communities that share the same name. Examples are plentiful: in terms of
gender issues, public health, and economic development, the fundamentalist Islam
of the tribal regions of Pakistan can only be regarded as atavistic when compared to
the religious pluralism of more moderate (and more advanced) forms of Islam, such
as those practiced by the Turkish Sufis. To take another example, in certain parts of
Southeast Asia, despite the crystal clear message of the Buddha regarding idolatry,
there are still religious people who claim to follow the teachings of Shakymuni but
continue to live in a world populated by invisible spirits that must be placated, that
constitute a drag on economic development, and that are the occasion for ethnic strife.11
The point that can be drawn from the discussion thus far, I hope, is the
salutary effect of a pragmatist approach to educating about religion that stresses
developmental trends in religious beliefs and institutions, all the while avoiding
hard and fast taxonomies. My suggestions follow the trails blazed by John Dewey
and William James. I am suggesting that we can teach our students that when religion is understood as a function of human life rather than as a set of ontological or
ideological commitments, they will be more likely to understand their own beliefs
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and practices, as well as those of their fellow global citizens half a world away, and
consequently more capable of making informed decisions about their own religious
commitments, or absence thereof.
I call this a pragmatist pedagogy because I am suggesting that we encourage our students to look at what a particular religious expression does—how it
functions—in the realms of ethics, aesthetics, politics, and the technosciences, for
example, and this from the perspective of a world that is shrinking day by day as
its networks of communication become more extensive and complex. I am suggesting that we encourage our students to consider how forms of religious expression
function in their local environments, as well as within the broader context of the
forces that are propelling globalization and in terms of those universalizable values that have been developed over time, such as those appearing in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
Citizens of our world community will have many opportunities and, indeed,
many incentives, to tailor their religious beliefs and institutions to their own needs
and interests, rather than just automatically accept those of the communities into
which they are born and nurtured. The results of the Pew surveys that I cited at
the beginning of my presentation surely support this claim. I am convinced that
the pragmatism of John Dewey and William James can help us develop a pedagogy to match the challenges of this situation, even though their accounts differ
in important respects.
For William James, religious belief is in some sense universal. Religious
belief is ultimately, in his view, a hedge against nihilism. But the particular form
religious belief takes is for him ultimately a matter of cultural background and
personal temperament.
The impulse to religious belief, he suggested, comes from what he termed the
“more” that is beyond the limits of conscious experience, and most likely a function of the subconscious. He wrote that it involves “some part of the Self unmanifested; and always . . . some power of organic expression in abeyance or reserve.”12
This “more” is a “subconscious continuation of our conscious life.”13 Then, in what
can only be described as a deft move, he added that “invasions” from the subconscious realm tend to take on objective appearances, and to give rise to feelings that
something outside the organism, perhaps even some personality, is in control of
the larger situation, if not destiny itself.
Why is this a deft move? Its force lies in the fact that James was at once laying the groundwork for two essential components of a pragmatist pedagogy of
religious experience. First, he was raising the possibility of a naturalized religious
experience that can be understood as a part of a common psychological inheritance that is therefore of universal import above sect and creed. But second, and
perhaps more important, he was also providing potential cover for the plethora of
religious expressions that are attuned to differences in culture and temperament.
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He accomplished this second move by introducing the concept of over beliefs.
“Here,” he wrote, “the prophets of all the different religions come with their visions,
voices, raptures, and other openings, supposed by each to authenticate his own
peculiar faith.”14 So it is here that temperament and cultural background are foregrounded, generating vast arrays of belief systems and institutions that ride forth
astride this universal psychological “more.”
Looked at from one end, we can see that James detected a sensibility common to all human beings that is rooted in the very nature of our common experiences of the vague, the fringe, and our common sense of our own finitude in an
infinitely complex and variable world. But this common sensibility takes on many
forms of expression. Looked at from the other end, religious expressions, though
richly variegated and complex, are rooted in experiences that are common to all
humans, simply because of the ways in which we have evolved with and experience
our environing conditions, including those that are social.
By making these moves, James’s implicit claim was that spirituality can be understood in naturalistic terms, as a common feature of human life. But has he not thereby
also opened the door to natural, which is to say, nonsupernatural religious belief? Has
he not opened the door to religious expressions that are humanistic at their core and
in their outlook? Has he not opened the door to the possibilities of religious belief on
the part of those of our students who feel themselves excluded from that possibility?
Has he not indicated how a bridge of understanding can be constructed between those
of our students who are religious exclusivists, those whose primary commitment is to
the relativism of deferral and difference, and even those who feel themselves excluded
from religious belief because of their lack of institutional affiliation?
In the postscript to The Varieties, James did in fact open the door to a type of
religious experience that is at once naturalistic, humanistic, and pragmatist. “The
practical needs and experiences of religion,” he wrote, “seem to me sufficiently met
by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him there
exists a larger power which is friendly to him and to his ideals. All that the facts
require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves.
Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step.”15
“Why,” he asked, “may not the world be a sort of republican banquet . . .
where all the qualities of being respect one another’s personal sacredness, yet sit at
the common table of space and time.”16
But if James just barely opened the door to a humanistic religious outlook
that is capable of serving as a common faith, then John Dewey eagerly flung the
door open wide and stepped through it. His little book A Common Faith, for example, might even be read as a reply to James. Dewey’s central argument was simple
enough, and doubtless familiar to this audience. It is highly relevant to our current
globalizing circumstances. He wanted to remind us that there is no such thing as
religion in general. There is no single unique property that all religions share. Given
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the plethora of possibilities, Dewey suggested, a person cannot choose religion in a
generic sense; religion in the generic sense simply does not exist. To choose a religion is to choose a particular outlook on life, a particular set of ideals. Moreover,
even if someone remains within the religious community into which he or she was
born and nurtured, that nevertheless constitutes a choice.
Dewey’s solution to the problem of choosing from among the world’s many
religions—or else coming to terms with the fact that none of them seem adequate
to one’s needs—was to propose a common faith. He invited us to turn our attention
from the noun religion to the adjective religious. He argued that religious qualities
are capable of permeating many types of experiences, including those that are moral,
aesthetic, and even political in nature. What he was after was naturalized forms of
religious experience: religious outlooks that are comfortable with the advances of the
technosciences, that do not attempt to compete with them regarding the control of
facts, and therefore that render supernaturalism a personal rather than a public matter. Because every human being lives, at the very least, in a natural world, these would
be forms of religious expression in which every human being could have a share.
“The aims and ideals that move us are generated through imagination,” Dewey
wrote. “But they are not made out of imaginary stuff. They are made out of the hard
stuff of the world of physical and social experience.”17 They involve “rearrangements of existing things.” They involve a “process of creation that is experimental
and continuous.”18 Dewey’s naturalism not only admitted, but celebrated human
“spirituality.” When he and his colleagues published their collection of essays on
philosophical naturalism in 1944, for example, they gave it the title Naturalism and
the Human Spirit. What they were offering was a form of spirituality that felt very
much at home with the technosciences and also with universalizable human values.
But Dewey’s common faith was not designed to be what the American Council on Education warned against, namely, a “public school sect, which would take
its place alongside existing faiths and compete with them.”19
So Horace Kallen may have gone a bit too far when he suggested that a democratic faith is “the religion of and for religions . . . [It is] the religion of religions.”20
Recurring to the excellent work that Feinberg and Layton have done regarding constitutional legitimacy and educational legitimacy, it is essential to recall that
pragmatist pedagogy advocates for free and open inquiry and discussion, and not
for or against any particular sect or religion. Dewey was not interested in undercutting any particular religious faith. He was, however, interested in the possibility of
recasting religious expressions in terms of their naturalistic context, and thereby
providing a framework of belief for those who, because they have abandoned religious institutions, have concluded that religious values are thereby closed to them.
Now there might be those who would still object that Dewey was crossing the
line of constitutional legitimacy when he raised the possibility that those of his students who felt alienated from religious institutions might nevertheless have religious
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experiences. But in a letter dated June 5, 1943, he provided a candid statement of
his purpose in writing A Common Faith that undercuts objections of this type. He
wrote to a U.S. army private named Charles E. Witzell, “I have taught many years
and I don’t think that any of my students would say that I set out to undermine
anyone’s faith . . . The lectures making up [A Common Faith] were meant for those
whose religious beliefs had been abandoned, and who were given the impression
that their abandonment left them without any religious beliefs whatever. I wanted
to show them that religious values are not a monopoly of any one class or sect and
are still open to them.”21 In other words, if there are religious qualities of many types
of experiences, including our experiences of ideals and ends-in-view, then religious
experience is available to everyone, regardless of a lack of institutional affiliation.
But there is something more going on here. James and Dewey were both
pragmatists, and one of the central ideas of pragmatism is that the meaning of a
concept lies in its conceivable practical consequences. Another of its central ideas
is that inquiry is at root experimental—that when it is successful it produces what
James termed truth and what Dewey termed warranted assertibility.
Dewey insisted that citizenship of any sort demands activities that involve
relationships with others, and that citizenship therefore requires that choices be
made between what is simply valued and what has proven by experimental means
to be valuable. Many of those choices inevitably involve forms of religious faith and
practice that have consequences for our fellow human beings.
James and Dewey, in their different ways, recognized that a tendency to
religious faith, broadly speaking, is virtually universal. Both opened the door
to naturalized forms of religious expression that are comfortable with the advances
of the technosciences. Both recognized the important roles of cultural context and
temperament in the choice of religious belief and practice. But both sought to find
ways that religious faith and practice, like every other area of life, could be informed,
intelligent, and melioristic in its practice and outlook. Theirs was a pluralism of a
critical variety, a celebration of the many and varied forms of religious expression
coupled with a commitment to the type of rigorous inquiry that can provide the
basis for choice when a choice must be made.
But what of personal need for supernaturalistic religious faith? As I have indicated, James attempted to solve this issue in terms of what he called over beliefs that
depend on cultural background and temperament. In his view, we have the right
to believe and act upon any hypothesis that is for us live, forced, and momentous.
But as a pragmatist James also recognized that it is only by their fruits that religious beliefs can be evaluated.
Dewey’s answer to this question took a different turn. He was a philosophical
naturalist, and thought that supernaturalism has effects that are often divisive and
debilitating. He nevertheless recognized that the effects of supernaturalist beliefs
are different for different people in different circumstances. In some circumstances,
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supernaturalism can function as an excuse for avoiding intelligent thought and
action. In other cases, supernaturalism functions as a means of seeing the world as
healthy, whole, and conducive to the values of community. It is only by the fruits of
religious belief—examining their place in processes of naturalistic inquiry—that
they can be judged.
I hope and expect that teaching about religious experience in our schools, colleges, and universities will become easier as the world’s cultures learn more about
one another. There are already models in music and food and popular culture for
such cross-cultural experiences. It is probable that even many of the world’s exclusivist religions will succumb to new opportunities for productive engagement with
other religious institutions.22 As educators, we can play a major role in promoting
and accelerating these developments.23
In conclusion, let me recur to the three types of students whose needs have
helped to structure this presentation. As we all know, teaching about religious
experience, like teaching other subjects of importance, is about enlarging our students’ options and choices.
To the student of an exclusivist persuasion, a pragmatist pedagogy of religion
can open the door to a genuine sense of alternatives in the way of religious belief,
and a sense of the effects that advances within the technosciences have had on the
objects of religious dogma, especially in terms of the evolution of religious faith,
practice, and institutions.
To the student who has been persuaded by relativist claims of deferral and
difference, a pragmatist pedagogy of religion can open the door to a genuine sense
of the processes by which effective evaluations of competing religious orientations
are possible in the light of the ideals, norms, and goals that are emerging as a part
of the processes of cultural diversity and globalization.
To the student who believes that religious faith is no longer possible for him
or her because affiliation with institutional religion is no longer possible, a pragmatist pedagogy of religion can open the door to an understanding of the potential
religious dimensions of all types of experiences, including those that are moral,
political, and scientific.
To students of all three types, and to their teachers, I offer the suggestion that
the versions of pragmatism advanced by William James and John Dewey offer rich
resources for those of us whose task it is to consider “what we can teach when we
teach (about) religion.”
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